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n his recent book  Decolonising Nature: 
Contemporary Art and the Politics of 
Ecology TJ Demos sums up the seriousness of 
the  environmental   challenge  facing    humanity 
(2016, 8-9). 
Humans, particularly ‘industrial humans’, 
have colonised the natural world subjecting it to 
mastery and ruthless exploitation, and have done 
so to the extent that the ecosystems on which they 
(we) depend are threatened. Demos is clear that 
the colonisation of nature can only be ameliorated 
by a political project, the decolonisation of his title 
(Demos 2016, 12).[1] 
So,howmightcontemporaryart, in some
small way, contribute to a politics of this kind? In
attemptingananswer,IwilldiscussPierreHuyghe's
much-praised work for Skulptur Projekte Münster,
2017, an ambitious piece calledAfter ALife Ahead.
This installation described by Huyghe as a “time-
basedbio-technicalsystem”,(Skulptur2017,210)is,
inmanyways,acomplexecology,onethatincludes
itshumanspectators.Insects,birds,andfisharealso
involved.Assuch,thepieceprovidesfertilegroundfor
thinkingthroughhumanity’s relationtonature,and
theroleartmightplayinitsdecolonisation.Demos,
describes the framework I will adopt when 
assessing the eco-politics of Huyghe’s work. 
I’m convinced that art, given its long 
histories of experimentation, imaginative 
invention, and radical thinking, can play a 
central transformative role here. In its most 
ambitious and far-ranging sense, art holds 
the promise of initiating exactly [the] kinds 
of creative perceptional and philosophical 
shifts, [needed to offer] new ways of 
comprehending ourselves and our relation 
to the world differently than the destructive 
traditions of colonising nature.  
(Demos 2016, 18-19)[2]   
In this quotation Demos highlights art’s ability to 
create shifts with regards to humanity’s “relation to 
the world”, these are transformations that occur in 
the understanding of an audience. Using 
shorthand, we might say that art produces 
‘counter-images’ that can change minds. Demos is 
clear regarding the mindset that needs changing. 
He explains that art should move “beyond 
anthropocentrism”, which “entails transcending 
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human-centered exceptionalism, no longer placing 
ourselves at the center of the universe and viewing 
nature as a source of endless bounty" (Demos 
2016, 19). 
An eco-political art, then, should produce 
images that work against anthropocentrism, 
providing ways for thinking humankind as being ‘in 
continuity with’, rather than ‘exceptional to’, 
nature, and on this basis feeling and acting in 
solidarity with the environment. It is art’s role in the 
shaping of individual and collective opinion that 
makes it political in this sense, functioning as 
the precondition for political ecological activity, 
whether that be via representational government 
or direct action.[3] I shall follow Demos in this 
understanding of art’s politics, seeing it as serving a 
‘conditioning’ role. I also agree with him in situating 
anthropocentrism as problematic, a viewpoint that 
needs to be overcome so that we might pursue 
ecological decolonisation. 
Where I differ, however, is on the precise 
character of the anti-anthropocentric image that is 
required.  For there is more than one way to 
contest this concept. Different philosophical 
perspectives can be critical of anthropocentrism, 
broadly speaking, but approach the task in very 
different ways. In this article, I shall articulate two 
of these positions. The first emphasises human 
nature continuity at the expense of difference, the 
second attempts to think this continuity whilst 
accommodating difference. I will defend the latter 
strategy and, perhaps contentiously, the difference 
that I uphold is one given by rational capacity, 
understood as the ability to wield sophisticated 
representational concepts.[4] In other words, I shall 
attempt to articulate an anti-anthropocentric 
image of ‘wo/man in the world’ that 
accommodates her rational capacity as different to 
most other processes and entities found within 
nature. This approach, as we shall see, is radically 
divergent from that employed by the other anti-
anthropocentric position discussed in this article.   
One of the problems with Demos’ book is 
that he does not recognise these two positions as 
different.[5] Another, related but bigger issue is that 
he, like most contemporary art writing on this 
subject, nails his colours to the wrong philosophical 
mast, at least as I see it. Much art theory, especially 
in relation to ecologically minded practice, is heavily 
influenced by what Peter Wolfendale has called the 
“OOO/ANT/NM axis” (Wolfendale 2014, 383). This 
string of initials stands for Object-Oriented 
Ontology, (as propounded by Graham Harman, 
Levi Bryant, Ian Bogost, and Timothy Morton), 
Actor Network Theory (associated with Bruno 
Latour), and New Materialism (as practiced by Jane 
Bennett, among others). In this article, I 
concentrate, particularly on Harman and Bennett. I 
agree with Wolfendale that despite these thinkers’ 
differences they share certain fundamental 
presuppositions. One consequence of this is that 
they advocate a particular counter-image of the 
human that offers essentially the same solution to 
anthropocentrism - they do so by taking aim at 
human rationality. 
It is often said, convincingly so, that 
Classical and Modern humanism represents an 
extreme form of anthropocentrism, and that this 
results from its understanding of rationality as 
completely distinct from (exceptional to) nature, an 
entirely different substance no less.[6] It is the 
understanding of man[7] as rational animal that 
secures his thorough separation from the 
nonhuman, his lack of solidarity with it.[8] In light of 
this, those thinkers that Wolfendale groups aim to 
undermine anthropocentrism by deflating the 
exceptional status of rationality to the point of its 
eradication, in other words, they propose an anti-
rational-anthropocentrism (from here on, Anti-
(r)centrism). With this eradication, Harman, and 
Bennett - for instance - are able to theorise the 
human as existing in complete continuity with the 
nonhuman. And, it is on this basis, one of similarity 
or non-difference, that solidarity with nature is 
secured. My position is that this outright 
philosophical attack on rationality is mistaken and 
that humanism ought to be contested differently. 
To restate, it is the Anti-(r)centric version 
of philosophical anti-anthropocentrism that has 
made the biggest splash in art. Huyghe’s recent 
output often being understood in this way.[9]  In 
relation to After ALife Ahead, I take the Artsy 
editorial of June 19, 2017, by Emily McDermott as 
exemplifying this interpretation. 
My key critique of the Anti-(r)centric 
position is that it achieves its apparent anti-
anthropocentrism, or complete continuity, by way 
of an argument that implicitly retains humankind’s 
central role within nature. There is, then, a major 
contradiction  at  its  heart.  To  be  clear  this hidden 
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anthropocentrism does not reproduce that image 
of wo/man-as-superior, characteristic of humanism. 
No, the entire raison d'etre of Anti-(r)centrism is 
empathy towards the nonhuman. But this well-
meaning attitude does still generate 
problems, particularly in terms of its philosophical 
coherence and, I think, its political effectiveness. I 
accuse Anti-(r)centrism of not giving due prominence 
to humanity’s ability to use technology so as to 
achieve certain ends, it underplays wo/man’s techno-
agency. My view, therefore, is that to propagate 
Anti-(r)centrism through art theory is to make 
artworks the bearers of a counter-image that does 
not offer the most effective resistance to the 
colonisation of nature, it does not condition 
spectators for political action in the best possible 
way. 
A better image, I think, is to be found in the 
recent work of Ray Brassier and Peter Wolfendale, 
a philosophical perspective termed Rationalist 
Inhumanism or simply Inhumanism.[10] In many 
ways,    this    position    can   be   understood  as an 
 
attempt to rescue an account of rationality from the 
baggage of Classical and Modern humanism. 
Following these philosophers, I understand it to be 
possible and indeed preferable to consider the 
human animal part of nature, whilst also 
manifesting a rational capacity that can be 
considered exceptional, so long as this is understood 
in a qualified sense. In contradistinction to 
traditional humanism this perspective holds 
rationality to be of nature. Brassier and Wolfendale 
draw on the findings of science in this assertion, for 
instance, understanding conceptual ability to be the 
result of Darwinian processes no different from 
those that shape any other animal capacity. To this 
extent Homo sapiens is dealt a blow to its 
narcissism shown to be “kin to all other living beings 
in a biological world devoid of hierarchy” (Cox, et al 
2015, 22) This blow is followed by another, 
Inhumanism, again in opposition to humanism, 
enjoins us to think rationality as separate from any 
particular ‘way of life’, or even any particular entity.[11] 
Humans are the bearers of this rational 
Pierre Huyghe 
After ALife Ahead, Installation, 2017, photograph by Ola Rindal curtesy of Skulptur Projekte © Pierre Huyghe 
7 
capacity but they do not ‘own’ it. Reason is to be 
seen as a type of ‘natural software’ that might run 
on different organic, and indeed inorganic 
platforms. It might well be recognised in other 
terrestrial animal species if it has not been already, 
or we might encounter extra-terrestrials that ‘use’ 
it, or it might well be created ‘artificially’. (That 
being said, in the following text, when I make 
reference to the ‘rational entity’, it is the human 
variant that I name.) 
Although rationality is not ‘substantially’ 
different from the rest of nature, it is rare in respect 
to that which science understands most of nature 
to be.[12] The crucial distinction is between causal 
processes and conceptual ones, the latter 
understood to provide the capacity for objective 
knowledge and techno-agency. The Inhumanist, 
therefore, does secure a distinction between 
rationality and other things and processes on the 
basis of this rarity, as well as the fact that the 
rational entity would appear ‘better’ able to 
achieve certain ends - at certain scales - than most 
natural, causal processes. There is then a partial 
discontinuity between any rational entity, which 
need not be human, and the rest. But, this does not 
mean that these entities should be considered 
entirely exceptional as they are of nature, their 
partial difference no reason for other entities to be 
devalued. 
This assertion of rationality’s difference, 
then, is not the complete separation offered by 
Classical/Modern humanism, rather, it is a complex 
picture that affords solidarity between rational 
entities and the rest, but one that makes room for, 
or works across, difference. I consider this 
Inhumanism to be preferable to Anti(r)centrism 
because, first, I find the image of wo/man 
described by it to be more philosophically 
convincing, less contradictory, also, the Inhumanist 
image has political consequences that I take to be 
more adequate to decolonising nature than those 
that flow from its rival. Importantly, this picture of 
the human gives its techno-agency sufficient 
weight. I will, therefore, pursue a reading of After 
Alife Ahead premised not on Anti-(r)centrism but 
Inhumanism. I shall start with a straight description 
of Huyghe’s work moving to an outline of the 
Anti(r)-centric interpretation, which will then be 
counterpointed with my own reading. 
After ALife Ahead, Description 
After ALife Ahead inhabited a decommissioned ice 
rink on the edge of Münster. The concrete surface 
of the old rink had been cut through, the sawyer 
slicing in such a way as to produce angular shapes. 
Most of these were removed exposing the earth 
below, excavated and modelled to create a 
landscape reminiscent of the American Badlands in 
miniature or perhaps the surface of an alien planet. 
Steep mounds and valleys as well as two irregular 
‘pillars’ - reminiscent of termite towers - were 
shaped from the earth. Pier-like forms jutted over 
the red landscape and some concrete sections 
acted as table-top plateaus for the mounds. 
Resting on one of these was an aquarium 
made of black switchable glass. This housed 
GloFish, a  trademarked brand of genetically 
engineered fluorescent fish as well as a Conus 
textile, a venomous species of sea snail with an 
intriguing patterned shell, white triangles floating 
over an orange background. To one side of the hall 
sat a piece of medical equipment, an incubator 
containing a petri dish of HeLa cells. This cell line 
was originally extracted from cancer patient 
Henrietta Lacks in 1951. Her cancerous cells were 
found to be ‘immortal’, continuing to divide and 
proliferate and to do so indefinitely even in vitro. 
This remarkable durability allowed the cells to be 
used in bio-scientific experiments. In After ALife 
Ahead this cell line sits unseen performing its 
‘immortal’ subdivision. 
ďŽǀĞ ƚŚĞ ůĂŶĚsĐĂƉĞ ͕ sĞǀĞƌĂů ůĂƌŐĞ
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝsĞĚ sŬǇůŝŐŚƚs ǁĞƌĞ ŝŶsƚĂůůĞĚ ͘ WĞƌŝŽĚŝĐĂůůǇ
ƚŚĞŝƌƚƌŝĂŶŐƵůĂƌsŚƵƚƚĞƌs ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŵŝƌƌŽƌĞĚƚŚĞsŚĂƉĞs
ŽŶƚŚĞŽŶƵsƚĞǆƚŝůĞsŚĞůůŽƉĞŶĞĚĂŶĚĞǆƉŽsĞĚƚŚĞ
ĂƌƚǁŽƌŬƚŽƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐǁĞĂƚŚĞƌĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶs ͘When it 
rained the piece got wet. This water contributed to 
shallow pools that rested in some of the 
landscape's hollows. These contained algae noted 
in Huyghe's ‘materials list' for the work. Other 
items listed included bees and Chimera Peacocks 
(Skulptur 2017, 210). On my visit, I didn’t see the 
birds but the insects were very much in evidence, 
flying singly and in small groups from one of the 
irregular pillars that acted as their hive. 
A piece of minimalist music rumbled, all 
atmospheric base and hum saturating the space. Its 
score was derived from translating the visual 
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pattern of the Conus textile shell into audio 
correlates. Huyghe also commissioned an app that 
could be downloaded and used by spectators to 
produce an augmented reality experience. When 
viewing the installation via one’s phone black 
triangular   shapes   appeared   to   hover   over  the 
landscape. 
Many of these installation components 
were connected to one another physically, 
networked into the aforementioned “time-based 
bio-technical system” (Skulptur 2017, 210). The 
music, the opening of the skylights, the opacity of 
the aquarium glass, the proliferation of augmented 
reality shapes, the division of cells, even the air 
quality in the hall were interrelated in an ongoing 
and changing system. 
The Anti-(r)centric Interpretation 
McDermott, in her Artsy piece, offers an 
assessment of After ALife Ahead that translates the 
Anti-(r)centrism of, for instance, Harman and 
Bennett into art criticism. She focusses on the way 
the piece’s network structure ‘situates’ the artist 
and spectator. She takes up this theme in the 
sentence below, directly quoting Huyghe as she 
does so: “the project’s complexity isn’t 
intended to confuse viewers but instead to 
make them question where its processes (and 
thereby wider processes within our lives) begin 
and end. 'It's a way to shift the centrality of the 
human position—whether as a maker or 
receptor.'" (McDermott 2017) 
Let us take the ‘decentering’ of the 
spectator (receptor) first; Huyghe’s point is that 
appreciation of After ALife Ahead as a complex 
system courses the spectator to question their own 
status as an isolated or exceptional individual, 
seeing themselves, rather, as merely one 
component within a set of symbiotic natural-
technological relations. The central position of the 
author (maker) is challenged too. This pertains to 
the way that the work’s human-techno-system is 
viewed as dependent upon - subject to interruption 
by - those biological elements imbricated with it. 
“He [Huyghe] designed the system such that the 
technology involved is dependent on natural 
factors, reversing the traditional notion that 
technologies can somehow bring nature under 
control” (McDermott 2017). 
It would seem that this relation of 
dependency, which mitigates against “control” is 
an instance of that gesture familiar to much 
modern and contemporary art wherein the artist’s 
mastery of their work is questioned. And this 
artistic decentering is taken to be a synecdoche for 
a more general point, the spectator is expected to 
understand the ‘unpredictable’ aspect of the piece 
as proving the falsity of wo/man’s belief in her 
ability to stand outside nature in order to 
technologically master it. So, both decenterings, 
that of the spectator and author confer the same 
meaning, the recognition that wo/man cannot be 
seen as exceptional to nature, rather she is 
continuous with it, one more component part. 
McDermott does not explicitly say what it 
is about the human that is being decentred. She 
does not use the word rationality. But, the simple 
fact that she concentrates almost exclusively on 
those ways that (Huyghe’s piece shows) 
humankind to be continuous with nature, without 
remainder, evidences her underlying allegiance to 
Anti-(r)centrism. This is because, as I have already 
mentioned, and as I hope to prove in a moment, 
Anti-(r)centrism is characterised by theorising 
rational and other entities to be the same. Another 
‘tell’ as to McDermott’s sympathies can be found in 
her interpretation of technology. It is a 
commonplace that humanity’s technology, 
from personal computer to space shuttle, evidences 
our rational abilities, or cognitive difference. As we 
have seen McDermott is scrupulous in disabling this 
common-sense view, exclusively emphasising those 
ways (Huyghe’s piece shows) that technology fails to 
achieve its objective, becomes interrupted by non-
technological forces, or moves beyond human 
jurisdiction. 
McDermott’s reading, then, hammers 
home those ways that After ALife Ahead prompts 
its spectator to feel a sympathetic and complete 
similarity with the nonhuman. As already outlined I 
am wary of this particular approach to anti-
anthropocentrism, of its non-accommodation of 
rational difference, but why? My first criticism is of 
a purely theoretical nature, I think that the image 
of wo/man presented by Anti-(r)centrism is 
philosophically contradictory. I will work through 
this criticism referencing the work of Harman and 
Bennett, and then highlight another, perhaps more 
serious problem with this framework. 
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Hidden Anthropocentrism 
Harman’s Object-Oriented Philosophy (OOP), has 
had an enormous influence on contemporary art. 
As is well known he focusses on objects, seeking to 
create an ontology which accounts for all of them, 
even conceptual, or fictitious ones. The opening 
sentences of The Quadruple Object make this clear. 
Instead of beginning with radical doubt, 
we start from naiveté. What philosophy 
shares with the lives of scientists, 
bankers, and animals is that all are 
concerned with objects. The exact 
meaning of "object" will be developed in 
what follows and must include those 
entities that are neither physical nor 
even real. Along with diamonds, rope, 
and neutrons, objects may include 
armies, monsters, square circles, and 
leagues of real and fictitious nations. All 
such objects must be accounted for by 
ontology. 
(Harman 2011, 5) 
But, more importantly for my current discussion, 
Harman also insists that these objects be 
accounted for equally. Wolfendale, in his book-
length critique of OOP names this imperative 
“ontological egalitarianism” (Wolfendale 2014, 
214). This is why Harman’s ontology is famously 
‘flat’, all objects must be presented as existing on a 
radically level plane. It is also clear that a very 
similar principle animates Jane Bennett’s approach, 
all material, from human bodies to worms are very 
deliberately positioned as objects of equal 
attention. 
This vibrant matter […] is my body but 
also, the bodies of Baltimore litter 
(chapter 1) Prometheus's chains (chapter 
4) and Darwin's worms (chapter 7) as well
as the not-quite-bodies of electricity
(chapter 2) ingested food (chapter 3) and 
stem cells (chapters 5 and 6).
(Bennett 2010, xiii)
This ontological egalitarianism includes the fact 
that all objects interact in the same way. Harman 
understands conceptual processes in a very 
particular way, they are, despite appearances, 
actually unexceptional. For him, rationality 
represents just another form of object-encounter, a 
premise we can see animating the following 
statement: “And like every exercise of intelligence, 
philosophy is less a creation of concepts than a 
creation of objects. Ultimately, the phrase 'object-
oriented philosophy' is redundant” (Harman 2005, 
247-248). For Harman, the characterisation of his 
philosophy as ‘object-oriented’ is superfluous 
because all philosophical programmes are objects, 
including the concepts they employ. In other 
words, conceptualisation bears no special 
dispensation, it functions in the same way as any 
other worldly interface.     
It is this eradication of rational 
exceptionality, its reframing as ubiquitous process, 
that I name Anti-(r)centrism. From this 
perspective, wo/man is not accommodated within 
the ‘tree of life’ as different but is merely one object 
amongst many. She is the same as, or in continuity 
with everything else: To restate then, and as we 
have seen, it is clear that positions such as these lie 
behind McDermott’s framing of After ALife Ahead, 
her emphasis on the similarity between human and 
nonhuman elements within Huyghe’s composition. 
I think, though, that this Anti-(r)centric 
image is philosophically contradictory. Weirdly, the 
continuity between wo/man-and-the-rest is won 
on the basis of the radical inflation of 
another of her capacities, that of experience. Peter 
Wolfendale names this inflation “introspective 
metaphysics” (Wolfendale 2014, 104-5). As is well 
known Harman’s philosophy begins with certain 
phenomenological premises. His method is to 
introspect the mechanics of human perception and 
feeling, analysing how the world appears to 
consciousness. This is a philosophical examination of 
how it is that wo/man relates experientially to the 
world. He then projects this model onto the world, 
or more specifically, onto the way that objects are 
and how it is that they interact with one another. (This 
projection is done by philosophical fiat, without any 
scientific justification.) In other words, he presumes 
that ‘the world’ is and behaves in a manner precisely 
comparable to humans, as perceptual and feeling
beings.Humanitystrippedofitsrational difference is 
presented in continuity with the world because 
everything therein is taken to be ‘like’ human 
experience. 
Bennett’s   methodology   is   similar.   She 
pereptual and feeling beings. Humanity, stripped  
Pierre Huyghe 
Artist Diagramme, Catalogue page, 2017, Skulptur Projekte © Pierre Huyghe 
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does not draw on the resources of 
phenomenology, but from a Deleuzian inspired 
philosophy of sensorial intensity. In the 
introduction to Vibrant Matter, she explains the 
development of her thinking as it has moved from 
theorising these intensities in human affairs to a 
broadening of this approach, so that all matter is 
seen to be affective (Bennett 2010, xii). 
It would seem to me, and following 
Wolfendale, that Bennett and Harman’s philosophical 
assertion of human continuity and non-
exceptionality, their Anti-(r)centrism, is secured by a 
move that grants the human qua experience 
a radical exceptionality, a status as ‘the measure of all 
things’. From this perspective wo/man cannot be, as 
Harman wants, just one object like any other because 
s/he is the first, or blue-print object… This move, then, 
secretly enshrines wo/man at the centre of the 
universe, in other words, it represents an “unbridled” 
anthropocentrism (Brassier 2015, 222). 
A philosophical position that begins with 
the attempt to displace the centrality of the human 
and results in an implicit re-establishment of that 
centrality, is, it must be said, a rather curious one. 
Certainly, for me, this ‘boomerang move’ makes it 
hard to take it seriously, and punctures its virtue as 
a profoundly ‘Copernican’ position. And, if we value 
theoretical clarity we might decry the way that this 
theory has influenced contemporary art, shaping 
the opinions of primary spectators and secondary 
audiences alike. This is certainly my personal 
opinion. 
But there is a bigger, if related issue 
bubbling away in the background. The reason Anti-
(r)centrism deflates reason and inflates experience 
is to posit a similarity between wo/man and the 
rest as the basis for solidarity. And it is my 
contention that theorising solidarity in this way 
actually inhibits political action. This is because any 
effective environmental politics needs to draw 
upon what I have been calling rational techno-
agency. To win solidarity at the expense of 
rationality, therefore, is to undermine humanity’s 
ability to best act upon this feeling. In Anti-
(r)centrism this techno-capacity is dissolved or 
subsumed into a generalised picture of agency as 
radically distributed. 
Distributed Agency 
In the world of Bennett’s New Materialism, ‘results’ 
are understood less in terms of human action 
(people-constituencies realising goals) than in 
relation to distributed networks of actor-entities 
causing certain ‘ends’. Thinking agency in this 
fashion holds faith with the principle of ontological 
egalitarianism already discussed. Bennett is 
dedicated to giving the agency of each and every 
material (worms, electricity) its due, seeing them, 
as far as she can, as equally weighted. It is this 
multiplicity of equal actors working upon one 
another in affective relations that make ‘outcomes’ 
nearly impossible to predict or direct by any 
human(s). Again, from this perspective wo/man 
deserves no ‘special’ distinction, in terms of getting 
‘things done’ she is, simply, one actor amongst 
many. We might say that Bennett’s picture subtly 
downgrades motivated or willed human action, 
especially in terms of the way it is commonly 
understood, presenting it to be not especially 
effective.[13] 
And this is where the problem lies. As I’ve 
already outlined, the aim of Anti-(r)centrism 
as political project is to motivate human actors. 
Bennett wants to encourage “more ecological and 
more materially sustainable modes of production 
and consumption”, she wants to “promote greener 
forms of human culture” (Bennett 2010, ix-x). This 
begs the question, is a theory that downgrades 
human agency as a matter of principle, the best 
vehicle for inspiring such political action? Would it 
not be reasonable for a reader to ask, what is the 
point of action when the theory extolling me to do 
so emphasises the limited nature of that action? 
Again, it is clear that McDermott is 
drawing upon this Anti-(r)centrist view of human 
agency in her theorisation of After ALife Ahead.  As 
we have seen the bio-techno system that 
animates After Alife Ahead is discussed only in 
those ways that it escapes or evades the direction 
provided by human agency, specifically of its artist 
creator. The idea that technology might enable 
some successful intervention into nature is 
understood to be ‘old-fashioned’. This is a vision 
that is skeptical of humanity's ability to achieve 
certain goals on the basis of its technological 
prowess. 
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If the spectator does feel that humanity 
has no special techno-agency then this has a knock-
on effect on the piece's art-politics. In a manner 
symmetrical to the question just posed to 
Bennett’s philosophy, is it not reasonable to 
assume that the spectator might ask, what is the 
point of, say, voting for renewable energies, if all 
such technological interventions are seen as 
limited, not especially effective? Huyghe’s piece, 
then, (as framed by Anti-(r)centrism) provides a 
picture of human nature continuity that might well 
result in a feeling of solidarity with the nonhuman – 
a solidarity built on similarity. But, this is gained at 
the expense of a spectatorial self-understanding as 
that entity able to really make a difference in 
particular situations, to collectively facilitate 
techno-political ecological action. After ALife 
Ahead, seen in this way, represents a problematic 
conditioning of its spectators. Rather than actively 
motivating political action it generates a certain 
friction.   
I hold that Inhumanism provides a better 
counter-image in this regard. Before showing how 
Inhumanist art-politics play out, I need to properly 
articulate the different assumptions, already 
gestured at in my introduction that distinguish this 
position from the Anti-(r)centric one. 
Inhumanism 
As alreadymentioned the Inhumanist perspective
figures rationality as different to most of nature.
Howso?Toreason,forBrassier,istoengagein"rule-
governed conceptual practices" (Brassier 2011,49)
thatareexceedinglyrare.Cognitiverule-followingis
fleshedout as a formof ‘strong knowing', that is:
"thetakingofsomethingassomething,classifyingan
object under a concept” (Brassier 2011, 49). This
classification is subject to “normative standards of
truthandfalsity”(Brassier2011,49), i.e.theagent
makingtheclassificationcanbecorrectorincorrect,
and must bear responsibility for their conceptual
judgment.Thisstrongrationalknowing,thatBrassier
alsocallssapience, is thencontrastedwithsensing
(sentience),understoodasoneexampleofamuch
morecommontypeofnaturalprocess.Hedescribes
sensingas “the registrationofa somatic stimulus”
and,further,as“theresponsivedispositionsthrough
which one part of the world – [for instance]
thermostat-transduces informationfromanother
part of the world – [i.e.] molecular kinetic 
energy” (Brassier 2011, 49). Sensing is different to 
knowing in that there is no conceptual classification 
involved. The thermostat bears no responsibility for 
the truth, or otherwise of its ‘somatic registration’. 
As Brassier says, “[t]he transduction of information 
may be adequate or inadequate to relative ends, 
but never ‘true’ or ‘false’” (Brassier 2011, 49). 
According to the Inhumanist, this ability to 
conceptually classify the world stands behind all 
manner of rational abilities. It is the means by 
which humans produce objective knowledge about 
the world via the disciplines of natural science. 
Again, to quote Brassier, “reason is our sole means 
of cognitive access to nature. There is no other way 
of knowing what nature is (certainly not intuition, 
pace Bergson and others)” (Brassier 2015, 
220-221). Second, this objective window on the 
world accounts for human techno-agency. 
I want to pause for a moment here, as 
claims around objectivity and technology can 
appear suspect, especially within the context of 
recent continental philosophy. To be clear Brassier 
does not posit articles of objective knowledge as 
timeless verities, rather they are always open to 
revision. The revisable nature of scientific 
postulations does not mean that, at any given 
historical junction they are untrue, but that their 
traction upon reality is likely to be reassessed or 
improved. Brassier is also very aware that the 
institutions of science are subject to social 
pressures that may distort the findings of particular 
research projects. One such distortion concerns the 
hold patriarchy has over the discipline. But, again, 
the recognition of this male dominance does not 
invalidate the notion that science is able, when 
functioning correctly, to make objective claims. Not 
all of its statements are dressed up biases or social 
distortions. Brassier’s stance is, therefore, different 
from those positions (sometimes feminist) that 
assert the impossibility of truth claims about the 
real. For instance, certain theorists “insist on the 
social […] construction not only of gender but of 
knowledge and truth, maintaining that 
epistemological and ontological claims are always 
[…] gendered, never neutral” (Cox et al 2015, 23).
[14] That this view exists and has a currency does not 
mean that a defence of rational objectivity is 
therefore necessarily anti-feminist. In fact, there is a 
body of cutting-edge feminist thought that takes 
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Inhumanism and Brassier's work very seriously 
indeed. I'm taking about Xenofeminism, a position 
that characterises itself as rationalist, defends 
scientific truth claims, whilst also engaging in a 
critique of those moments where existing science 
falls short.[15] 
The Inhumanist Interpretation 
With this clarification in mind, we can return to the 
main argument. Following Brassier we can 
understand reason as different to other natural 
processes such as ‘somatic registration’ and that 
this difference confers upon its users' certain 
capacities. (And that these capacities are not 
necessarily tied to social exclusion or dominion.) To 
interpret After ALife Ahead through this lens is to 
read in a way that makes room for this rational 
difference. For instance, we might begin by 
recognising that After ALife Ahead was an imposing 
piece. The size and ambition of the install as 
impressive as the manner of its realisation. The 
surface of the old ice rink had been broken apart 
like the crisp on a crème brûlée. The revealed earth 
‘terraformed’ into an alien setting, in a manner as 
convincing as any sci-fi movie set. This was not a 
work that dissimulated itself as ‘made artefact’. It 
was an ostensible, ostentatious even, piece of 
human engineering. To grasp the work as 
Inhumanist involves an appreciation of these 
characteristics as indexing rational knowledge and 
technical expertise, or in other words, it is to see the 
piece as a rational ‘feat'. For instance, the ability to 
‘landscape’ an environment so effectively is 
understood to depend upon the objective 
knowledge of physical properties and how these 
might be manipulated. To read in this way is to be 
impressed by these capacities, to see them as 
unusual and distinctive. 
This impression of the work is only 
magnified the more we attend to its complexity. 
The work’s components were bound together with 
enormous intricacy in a series of physical 
interactions. For instance, hidden within the space 
were sensors that both tracked the movements of 
peacocks and bees, as well as measuring the 
proportion of carbon dioxide - and even certain 
bacteria - within the hall. This data was then 
processed by a piece of software, Huyghe called it 
a “genetic algorithm” that created a ‘measure’ of 
the space’s “vitality” (Skulptur 2017, 210). This was 
then used to control the conditions within the 
medical incubator, such that: “When the space has 
a higher vitality, so does the petri dish with cancer 
cells. When it has a lower vitality, the algorithm 
slows the cells’ rate of reproduction” (McDermott 
2017). In turn, the rate of division amongst the cells 
influenced those digital shapes produced within 
the spectator’s phone app. These shapes, however, 
disappeared (were killed off) when a skylight was 
opened. Furthermore, the opening of the skylight 
changed the CO2 content of the space as did the 
number of spectators present, renewing the sensor 
readings and thus changing the characteristics of 
the installation. Whether the skylights were open 
or closed was dependent upon the transparency of 
the aquarium’s switchglass, which in turn was 
affected by the musical score 
From the Inhumanist perspective, rational 
capacity lies at the root of this complexity. For 
instance, the biomedical component of the work, 
the quiet subdivision of cells within the incubator, 
draws attention to humanity’s ability to strongly 
know the world, to deeply understand its structure 
in a way that enables successful intervention into 
that very structure, to extract a cell line, clone it and 
artificially maintain its reproduction, for instance. 
And, importantly, the work’s complex network 
structure draws attention to the human skills 
involved in creating such a demanding 
‘computational organisation’. I would argue, then, 
and to re-state, that to see After ALife Ahead in this 
way prompts an appreciation not only of the 
capabilities of Huyghe and his team but of rational 
difference in general. On viewing the piece, a 
spectator understands humans as capable of 
objective thought and its technological 
application: impressive capacities well described by 
Brassier. 
But, importantly, this understanding 
of After ALife Ahead as ‘feat’, represents only one 
half of the Inhumanist perspective, it is not the full 
story. This is because Inhumanism does not promote 
that understanding of the human animal as 
completely different, as per Classical/Modern 
humanism. Therefore, an Inhumanist interpretation 
of Huyghe’s work would not only focus on those 
ways that his piece reveals difference, but it would 
also set itself the task of showing how After ALife 
Ahead also shows rationality to be entirely natural. 
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In other words, the Inhumanist interpretation 
would show that rational distinctiveness is not 
total, that it does not destroy human nature 
continuity. 
Brassier draws attention to this feature of 
Inhumanism when he stresses that philosophers 
and (neuro)scientists should commit themselves to 
revealing how cognition is resolutely of the world. 
This means illuminating the material basis for 
rationality (within the brain, as well as without). 
Yet reason is not supernatural because rules 
(i.e., concepts) must be realised in patterns: 
they can do nothing independently of their 
material realisation. In other words, concepts 
are functions, but functions must be 
materially realised in order to do anything – 
and I use “material” in the broadest possible 
sense here, to encompass the microphysical, 
neurobiological, and sociohistorical domains. 
(Brassier 2015, 221) 
It is also beholden upon philosophy and science to 
explain how our knowledge emerged 
from ubiquitous natural process, in other words, 
how transduction might have made the 
evolutionary move into ‘knowing that’. Both these 
interrelated tasks are complex and ongoing, but, 
suffice to say, they index Brassier’s commitment to 
rationality as partially exceptional, that is a 
difference nevertheless fundamentally continuous 
with nature. 
As we have seen via McDermott’s review, 
it is possible to read After ALife Ahead as containing 
many moments in which this human nature 
continuity is stressed. The Inhumanist 
interpretation concurs with the Anti-(r)centric one 
here. They agree that Huyghe’s work represents 
human nature continuity, but, ultimately, they 
draw different conclusions from this shared 
assessment. For instance, the Inhumanist agrees 
with McDermott when she describes how After 
ALife Ahead causes the spectator to understand 
humanity as ‘decentred’ in relation to its 
technology. (As we have seen, she draws attention 
to the way that the bio-techno system that 
underlies the piece is not, at any given moment, 
controlled by a human (artist) operator.) The 
Inhumanist view, however, disagrees with 
McDermott over exactly how we should 
understand this decentring. We can characterise 
the Anti-(r)centrist reading as holding to an overly 
strong interpretation; wo/man is totally decentred 
from a position of distinct difference, thereby 
rendered completely continuous without any claim 
to be able to control nature more than any other 
entity. The Inhumanist interpretation, on the other 
hand, interprets decentering in a ‘softer’ manner, 
and this is because its reading is leavened by that 
understanding of Huyghe’s work as ‘feat’ already 
discussed. In other words, for the Inhumanist, the 
decentering unquestionably produced by Huyghe’s 
work is conjoined with the idea that humanity is 
different, in possession of certain distinctive 
rational capacities. 
So, bringing these two perspectives 
together prompts the Inhumanist to recognise that 
wo/man can never be in complete control of 
nature, because she is part of the world, in 
continuity with it; her techno-agency always likely 
to be met with resistance by other vital materials, 
those sharing the same ecology as her. But, this 
does not mean that we should see her techno-
agency as completely continuous with - the same 
as – all other a-rational actors. And, the fact that our 
intentions, or ambitions to control (certain 
situations) can be thwarted does not mean that we 
are poor at utilising our techno-agency to achieve 
certain goals. In fact, we are often very good at 
achieving these, impressively so. The notion that 
we as a species can achieve objectives is not always 
a hubristic one. The Inhumanist sees the 
engineered complexity of After ALife Ahead as a 
manifestation and celebration of this ability. Contra 
Anti-(r)centrism, then, humanity can be seen as 
decentred, and continuous with nature but 
not completely so. 
In sum, to understand Huyghe’s piece 
through the lens of Inhumanism is to see it as 
articulating those ways that the rational actor is 
both different and in continuity with nature. The 
Inhumanist approach is characterised, therefore, 
by the effort to understand After ALife Ahead as 
bearing both of these meanings. We can 
understand these significations to be in a dialectical 
relation with one another, such that the spectator 
‘first’ appreciates the human animal to be part of 
nature, then, that it is also different, and finally that 
it is, therefore, part of nature as different. 
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Inhumanist Art Politics 
Huyghe’s work under an Inhumanist reading is a 
carrier of this complex picture of wo/man in the 
world, one that represents a rational anti-
anthropocentrism. By these lights, rationality is 
considered to be entirely of the world. This 
continuity, or similarity in kind, is the basis for 
solidarity between the human and nonhuman. As I 
have argued, this solidarity is the precondition for 
acting in consort with nature, taking concrete 
measures towards its decolonisation, for instance, 
voting or demonstrating in favour of radical 
environmental policy. This is a similar ethico-
political principle to that which underlies the Anti-
(r)centrist perspective. But, an artwork understood 
to be Inhumanist doesn’t suffer the contradiction 
that undermines its theoretical rival; it does not call 
for action whilst implicitly disrupting the basis for 
that action, i.e. by promoting the idea that human 
techno-agency is no more nor less than any other 
object-encounter or ‘vital transduction’. This is 
because the basis for Inhumanist solidarity does 
not eradicate rational difference. 
In other words, the philosophical image 
of wo/man carried by Inhumanist art is better than 
that contained in the Anti-(r)centrist version 
because it gives human agency its due. From this 
perspective, the spectator of After ALife Ahead is 
less likely to respond to the recognition of 
nonhuman-solidarity with a shrug, to feel that any 
personal action on this basis - voting or 
campaigning for techno-political solutions - is likely 
to be ineffective in the last instance. The 
Inhumanist perspective shows that solidarity with 
nature need not mean that wo/man must 
renounce her self-understanding as technologically 
proficient, even remarkable. Huyghe’s work as an 
impressively engineered artefact should be seen as 
promoting this form of causal power. Understood 
in this way After ALife Ahead can be seen to 
condition spectators so as to render (more) likely 
political action on the basis of solidarity with 
nature, in other words, to grease the transition 
from solidarity to action. 
Conclusion 
This article has sought to contest the hold
exerted by the OOO/ANT/NM axis on
contemporary art theory and practice. I have
donesoinordertopursueatheoreticalimageof
wo/manintheworld,onewhichmightforman
effectivebasis for thedecolonisationofnature.
Harman and Bennett are problematic to the
extentthattheirAnti-rational-anthropocentrism,
a position that attempts to eradicate any
exceptionality for the human subject qua
rationality, results inphilosophicalcontradiction
and ‘tacitly’debilitatespoliticalaction. I turned,
instead, to the philosophy of Ray Brassier and
PeterWolfendale,specificallytheirInhumanism,
so as to formulate another image, one that
although not conventionally anthropocentric
maintained a place for humankind’s rational
difference,i.e.itscognitivefacility.Thisposition,
Inhumanism,wasseentoprovidenofrictionto
the potential development of a political
constituencydevotedtonature’sdecolonisation.
IsoughtalsotoreadPierre Huyghe’s After ALife 
Ahead as the bearer for this Inhumanist image 
of wo/man in the world, understanding the 
piece to effectively precondition spectators for eco-
political action. 
Coda: Post Truth and OOP 
Thetaskofaddressingourenvironmentalcrisis
now faces a further complexity. The most
powerful government in the world denounces
environmental issues, for instance blithely
dismissing the scientific consensus around
climate change.[16] It does so, in part, by
employingastrategycharacteristicofso-called
‘post-truth' politics, that is, the systematic
discreditingofobjectiveknowledge.Underthis
purview,climatechangeistakentobemerelya
suspicious theory, promulgated by a cabal of
corruptexperts (Runciman2017). That science
hasa legitimateclaimtoobjectivity is ignored,
or rather, objectivity is no longer themeasure
by which truth is accounted. Fact, rather, is
taken to be bestowed by the strength of the
intuitive or emotional pull of any given
message,aswellastheforceandrepetitiveness
with which it is communicated (Runciman
2017). It is clear that the current state of
politicaldiscourse,itspost-truthcondition,
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exacerbates our contemporary ecological crisis, 
disrupting our collective ability to understand and 
take action. Any effective decolonial project, 
therefore, must resist the post-truth ideology. 
It is my contention that this task requires 
philosophical resources that defend science as 
producing knowledge of the world in itself (i.e. 
objective knowledge). We need a way to 
understand and articulate this comprehension as 
having a legitimate authority. The consensus on 
climate change, for instance, involves hypothesis, 
and these are liable to change, but, they are 
supported by evidence in a manner that gives them 
legitimacy and authority over theories that purport 
description of the natural world without such 
evidence.[17] Following Brassier and Wolfendale, 
and as already suggested, I understand Anti-
(r)centrism to be inadequate regarding 
this defence of objectivity. In what follows I shall 
focus upon the work of Harman attempting to 
address his work in relation to post-truth politics. 
I shall begin with a quotation. In it, 
Wolfendale accounts for the difference between 
Harman and other philosophers associated with so-
called Speculative Realism. Object-Oriented 
Philosophy is different in approach to the systems 
of Quentin Meillassoux et al because, unlike theirs, 
it is a veiled form of anti-realism.  
The reason that OOP is the odd man out 
of the initial SR group is not that it refuses 
materialism, but rather that it refuses to 
have any truck with positive epistemology 
whatsoever. Regardless of the supposed 
ontological realism in which it dresses 
itself up, its epistemological anti-realism is 
pervasive and corrosive to the realist spirit 
that the other approaches, for the most 
part, represented. Most tellingly, the 
rallying cry […] that we take the literal 
pronouncements of the sciences seriously 
is completely rebuffed by OOP.  
(2014, 402) 
Wolfendale’s criticism is clear, OOP is little 
interested in epistemology, commonly understood 
as the grasping of positive facts, rather it concerns 
itself with delineating a certain ‘negativity’ that 
disrupts all such attempts to understand. Harman 
asserts that the reality of objects is essentially 
hidden from knowledge, in other words “[r]eal 
objects withdraw from our access to them, in fully 
Heideggerian fashion. The metaphors of 
concealment, veiling, sheltering, harbouring, and 
protecting are all relevant here” (Harman 2009, 
195). One consequence of this philosophical move 
is that wo/man can never make contact with the 
object in itself, rather she only encounters the 
sensuous surface of any given thing. From this 
perspective the pronouncements of science, for 
instance, those which claim to track the deep 
structure of the universe, cannot be 
taken literally they must always be seen to miss 
that withdrawn structure, to track only the 
sensuous realm. This gap between what scientists 
think they are doing, and what they actually 
achieve is one reason to be skeptical of them. 
Another is that according to Harman, 
scientific knowledge should not be privileged even 
in the sensuous realm. Science misses the 
metaphysical truth in a manner that is 
absolutely ubiquitous. As we have seen, Harman 
levels the interaction between any ‘thing’ and 
another, describing all in terms of a rather crude 
‘object-encounter’. This is seen to be true for both 
material reality, conventionally understood, but 
also within the realm of human thought and 
knowledge; concepts, words, statements, etc., are 
all objects. From this perspective, then, a scientific 
concept’s relation to its ‘target’ is synonymous 
with, for instance, fire’s relation to cotton. Harman 
says: “I hold that interaction between cotton and 
fire belongs on the same footing as human 
interaction with both cotton and fire” (Harman 
2011, 6).[18] This emphasis on the similarity 
between conceptual and other natural processes 
serves to undermine scientific claims by relativizing 
them, making them no different, essentially 
speaking, from causal processes.  Harman, 
therefore, deflates their descriptive value and 
significance. Harman’s notion of the ‘relative’ 
worth of scientific pronouncements is another 
reason to be skeptical. 
As we have seen this stance of skepticism 
towards scientific truth also characterises the post-
truth position, albeit for very different reasons. 
There is a symmetry between OOP and post-truth, 
one  that  makes  it  hard  for  the  Object-Oriented  
philosopher to chastise the post-truth demagogue 
for his ‘freedom with the facts’, especially with 
17 
scientific truths. The philosopher cannot articulate 
this particular criticism because it would demand 
a defence of the special status of scientific fact 
as really diagnostic (of the in-itself), a status that 
the Object-Ontologist does not accord science. 
It is my contention that this epistemic 
skepticism is translated into the Anti-(r)centric 
interpretation of After Alife Ahead. McDermott’s 
emphasis on Huyghe’s piece as prompting 
spectators to appreciate themselves (qua human) 
as decentred, so as to be completely in continuity 
with nature, mimics (and performs) 
Harman’s relativising move. As we have seen, the 
Inhumanist reading, on the other hand, offers a 
foundation from which to contest the post-truth 
position. From this perspective, After ALife Ahead is 
viewed as an impressive ‘feat’, one that indexes 
humanity’s rational ability to strongly know the 
world. The piece, therefore, can be seen to 
propagate the idea that objectivity is possible. This 
idea is a necessary weapon in the fight against post-
truth politics. In communicating this message to its 
audience, we might situate After ALife Ahead as 
contributing to the development of a constituency 
who recognise the justified authority of scientific 
knowledge, and are thus better placed to dismiss 
the Trumpian demagogue, especially as he 
attempts to undermine the validity of those 
scientific theories best able to aid in our attempts 
to decolonise nature. 
Notes 
[1] Demos’ title also reflects his recognition that our
environmental crisis is bound up with the colonial
exploitation of ‘non-western’ people.
[2] In this quotation Demos posits a central role for art in
the task of shaping opinion. This is because the tradition
of radicality within modern and contemporary art, its
iconoclasm, makes it a discipline well suited to the
propagation of counter images. But Demos is also clear
that the eco-political project requires the
mass mobilisation of media, print, and broadcast, etc. Art
plays but one part.
[3] Art can, of course, be formulated as political in many
other ways. For instance, artists might actively intervene
in a social situation bringing practical aid to a 
disadvantaged community, and/or mobilise direct
activist strategies, such as staging protests, organising
occupations, etc. Or, an artwork might be political in the
way that its materials and relations of production are
organised so that it enacts, say, environmentally friendly
ways of being-in-the-world. It is also the case that these
 strategies create their own image-interventions; an 
occupation, for instance, is both a physical and symbolic 
action after all. A great strength of Demos book is that it 
covers all of these methods and is attentive to these 
overlaps. I agree with him that these forms are not 
mutually exclusive and all should be championed. Art’s 
contribution to a political ecology must be pursued on as 
many fronts as possible. My task in this article, 
however, is less ambitious than that tackled by Demos. I 
concentrate on one aspect of art’s political valence, that 
of image intervention as produced by artworks in 
relation to a ‘conventional’ spectatorial situation. I do so 
not to privilege this encounter but to mark out a defined 
territory so as to focus, in a fine-grained manner, on a 
particular philosophical query. The question is this: what 
is the best way to think an anti-anthropocentric image? 
[4] This qualified defence of rationality is contentious
because continental philosophy has for a time now been
suspicious of this term. I take the view along with other
projects such as Xenofemism and Left-accelerationism
that rationality can be put to emancipatory work.
(See http://www.laboriacuboniks.net/; http://criticallegalt
hinking.com/2013/05/14/accelerate-manifesto-for-an-
accelerationist-politics/)
[5] This is exemplified by the way that Demos understands
Brassier’s philosophy as offering essentially the same
insight as Harman’s. In the terms of my argument Demos
does not make a distinction between $nti-(r)centrism and
Inhumanism.
[6] I am referring to the ‘mind-body dualism’ derived from
the philosophy of René Descartes.
[7] I have been gender specific here because
Classical/Modern humanism did understand rationality to
be the preserve of men. From this point on I shall refuse
such thinking by employing the term wo/man.
[8] This point is made forcefully in Rosi Braidotti’s The
Posthuman.
[9] For instance, a review of Huyghe’s retrospective at the
Pompidou has this to say: “Huyghe’s exhibition echoes
the critique of anthropocentrism inherent in such
branches of contemporary philosophy as […] object-
oriented ontology” (Khazam 2013).
[10] For a clear account of this term see Wolfendale’s self-
published dictionary definition:
https://www.academia.edu/26697819/Rationalist_Inhum
anism_Dictionary_Entry_ The word, as used by
Wolfendale and Brassier bears little resemblance to
*iorgio $gamben and 5oberto (sposito¶s mobilisation of
it. )or $gamben the Inhuman plays a role in a comple[
deconstruction of the subMect he wants to develop an
ethics that is ontologically prior to that e[plored within
traditional human rights frameworks. )or instance, see
his discussion of the µ0uselmann¶ in Remnants of
Auschwitz $gamben. 6imilarly, (sposito uses the
Inhuman to worry problematic distinctions and
presumptions that underlie rights discourses, proposing
an alternative µ7hird 3erson¶ perspective. 7he difference
between these approaches to the Inhuman and the
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Inhumanism of %rassier and :olfendale is profound and 
very comple[. 8nfortunately, an analysis of these 
dissimilarities is beyond the remit of this current essay. 
[11] As has been thoroughly and convincingly theorised
humanism, as it emerged in Europe during the Middle
Ages and evolved in the Modern period, conflated
rationality with ‘a way of life', the particular virtues,
vices and prejudices of western culture. This conflation
acted as part of the justification for the colonial project.
[12] Inhumanism in this way moves beyond the tired
Cartesian assertion that thought and material are
incommensurably different – distinct substances.
[13] Bennett admits that her analysis of material agency
over-reaches itself somewhat, when she says: “I will
emphasize, even overemphasize, the agentic
contributions of nonhuman forces (operating in nature, in
the human body, and in human artefacts)” (2010, xvi)
[1] This passage refers to the work of Donna Haraway.
[1] The following paragraph from the influential
Xenofeminist manifesto makes all these points
succinctly and is worth quoting at length.
"Xenofeminism is a rationalism. To claim that reason or
rationality is ‘by nature' a patriarchal enterprise is to
concede defeat. It is true that the canonical ‘history of
thought' is dominated by men, and it is male hands we
see throttling existing institutions of science and
technology. But this is precisely why feminism must be a
rationalism—because of this miserable imbalance, and
not despite it. There is no ‘feminine' rationality, nor is
there a ‘masculine' one. Science is not an expression but
a suspension of gender. If today it is dominated by
masculine egos, then it is at odds with itself— and this
contradiction can be leveraged. Reason, like information,
wants to be free, and patriarchy cannot give it freedom.
Rationalism must itself be a feminism. XF marks the
point where these claims intersect in a two-way
dependency. It names reason as an engine of feminist
emancipation and declares the right of everyone to speak
as no one in particular" (Cuboniks).
[1] I am of course referring to the US Administration’s
attitude, exemplified by its recent withdrawal from the
Paris climate agreement.
[1] To be clear, understanding the pronouncements of
science to have authority in this way does not preclude 
critical assessment of their content, including ‘calling 
out’ bad science.
[1] ³:hen fire burns cotton, it makes contact only with
the flammability of this material [«] &otton-being is
concealed [«] from all entities that come into contact
with it´ +arman 211, .
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